A firm's production activities are often supported by non-production activities. Among these activities are administrative units including headquarters, which process information both within and between firms. Often firms physically separate such administrative units from their production activities and create stand alone Central Administrative Offices (CAO). However, having its activities in multiple locations potentially imposes significant internal firm face-to-face communication costs. What types of firms are more likely to separate out such functions? If firms do separate administration and production, where do they place CAOs and why? How often do firms open and close, or relocate CAOs? This paper documents such firms' decisions on their spatial organization by using micro-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau.
Introduction
Firms' production activities are supported by various non-production activities such as management, marketing and administration. Such administrative and management activities play crucial roles including coordinating and monitoring production and purchasing services. While such administrative functions can be in principle performed at the same site where production takes place, many firms separate out such functions in favor of stand alone Central Administrative Offices (CAO) that include Headquarter (HQ) offices. Administration, when separated from production activities, can incur significant communications costs to overcome the loss of face-to-face interaction. Given this, why do firms separate central administration from production? What firm characteristics are associated with this decision? Some guidance can be found in the literature of industrial organization, corporate culture, and urban economics (e.g. Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Cremer, 1995; Davis and Henderson 2003; Duranton and Puga, 2002; Eccles, 1998; Lovely, Rosenthal, and Sharma, 2002; etc.) .
While the literature on industrial organization and corporate culture does not address physical separation per se, several papers hint that there are potential managerial advantages in just separating the monitoring or evaluation authority from production plants. For example, in the theoretical work of Cremer (1995) , under some conditions, a firm may choose optimally a lower level of monitoring ability, since a more accurate technology reduces the agent's incentive to work to signal high ability. Similar arguments can also be found in Aghion and Tirole (1997) . In the context of the spatial organization of a firm, the firm's choice of a lower level of monitoring technology could be reflected in its decision to physically separate administration from production.
Another insight can be found in Eccles (1985) , which discusses the idea that suspicion among plants about unfair treatment of some plants over others can corrupt incentive schemes of the firm. While it is not addressed in Eccles (1995) , in the context of firms' spatial organization, the remedy for such a problem could be to physically separate the evaluation authority from all the production plants. Such separation may be particularly important when firms are industrially diverse. For example, suppose a firm has two plants each producing different products. If one plant's site is chosen for a firm's 4 administration as well, the plant whose site was not chosen may suspect that the firm's prime focus is on the other plant (for marketing or investing in fixed capital assets). As another example, suppose a firm has plants that are geographically dispersed. If plants are far apart, they may have little knowledge about the performance of other plants; this makes it difficult for a plant to see if the evaluation is fair by checking its performance relative to others. In such a situation, locating the evaluation authority at a site of one of the plants may incur a risk of a perception of bias in management practice. It is also possible that the separation of administration and production for a firm with geographically dispersed plants occurs so administration is placed to be able to reach all plants more equally.
In the literature in urban economics and economic geography, there are several papers that do explicitly examine physical separation. In the earlier literature (Aksoy and Marshall, 1992; Ginzberg, 1977) , administrative functions represented by headquarters were viewed as being primarily located in large metro areas such as New York and were in fact providing the economic base for such cities. As we point out in this paper, such views appear to take a rather extreme position about the role of headquarters in some big cities.
However, the modern urban economics literature provides some key insights, which are summarized in the notion of "functional specialization" introduced by Duranton and Puga (2002) . Here, a firm may find it advantageous to locate production facilities in smaller (lower cost) and more specialized cities and set up its headquarters and administrative functions in a large diverse metro area with better availability, quality, and diversity of business and financial services. Such business and financial service inputs may be largely non-transportable, since design, purchase, and on-going usage require repeated face-to-face interactions between buyer and seller (Kolko, 1999) . By locating a CAO in a large metro area within service concentrations and benefiting from the access to variety of services, a firm may be able to improve its overall productivity (Davis and Henderson, 2003; Ono, 2003) .
Moreover, a firm may want a CAO "representative" in large visible markets, in order to help market the firm and hence indirectly the firm's products. Such CAOs might gather information from other CAOs (Davis and Henderson, 2003; Lovely, Rosenthal, 5 and Sharma, 2001 ) as well as other types of representatives of other firms about market conditions domestically and internationally.
As described above, the current literature provides some insights about a firm's decision whether to physically integrate or split management and production across multiple locations. However, in the literature there is little known about the actual patterns of such spatial organization of firms. For example, while people have written about the role of headquarters in cities such as New York, relatively little is known about which firms have headquarters or other managerial and administrative offices, where they are located, what they do in cities, whether such offices are more permanent versus fluid in location, and the like.
The goal of this paper is to document some stylized facts as a baseline for future theoretical and empirical work, 1 by presenting a variety of evidence on the nature and roles of CAOs. CAOs are a significant part of the US economy, accounting for about 2.5 million workers. However, such offices are created by less than 5 % of US firms and these firms, as we will show, are very large. One key issue explored in this paper is, among bigger firms, what firm characteristics and organization determine whether a firm has a CAO or not. A second issue concerns whether the notion of functional specialization as in Duranton and Puga (2002) appears in the data. Do CAOs outsource and if so how important is it? Is outsourcing just a substitute for activities that were performed in-house, or is there any evidence to suggest that in-house and outsourced activity complement each other? Moreover, in terms of physical separation, CAOs are divided into those that are located near production units and those that are not collocated with any production units. We will explore what firm characteristics and spatial structures are associated with a firm's decision to collocate their CAOs or not.
Given plants are dispersed and many CAOs are collocated with plants, one could also expect a high degree of spatial dispersion of CAOs. We will examine the extent of spatial dispersion versus the extent of clustering of CAOs in major metro areas such as New 1 The prototype we have described best fits manufacturing firms. However, it also applies well to retail firms, in which CAOs of a department store chain coordinate the functions of the "production facilities" spread over many small and large metro areas and purchase intermediate service inputs for the firm. A similar comment applies to the financial and banking sectors.
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York and Chicago, and ask whether NY represents a "corporate control" center as envisioned by Ginzberg (1977) .
Finally, we turn to the topic of turnover -openings and closings -of CAOs, to see to what extent firms adjust the location of their administrative offices over time.
Because CAOs support firms' production activities, firms may change CAO locations to accommodate various changes in their production activity. It is also possible that a firm adjusts CAO locations based on its experience, as it learns its optimal spatial organization as a whole and locations that are suitable or not suitable in which to locate administrative functions.
We will examine whether the rates and patterns of CAO turnovers are any different from those for production plants, by comparing our finding with Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988) . As we show, CAOs are set up by large firms; thus we might expect set-up decisions to have a high degree of persistence. On the other hand, CAOs require low fixed capital and are potentially easier to relocate. Is there a suggestion in the data that firms experiment with CAO locations, for example, to find the best outsourcing places?
Below, we start with describing the details of the data and several stylized facts regarding CAO establishments and their firms. Then we turn to a more detailed examination of the questions and issues posed above.
Data and Overview
The main data sets we use in this paper are micro-level data from the Auxiliary Establishment Surveys (AES) and the Standard Statistical Establishments Lists (SSEL) compiled and organized by the U.S. Census Bureau. The AES is a census containing the CAO information while the SSEL is the list of all private establishments in the USA containing basic information such as location, industry, and total employment. Since the SSEL also provides the identifier of a firm with which each establishment is affiliated, the SSEL can be used to construct firm level characteristics. Such information can be linked to CAOs again using the firm identifier. We identify by firm the main production 7 activity (industry), degree of industrial diversification, geographical relationship among production facilities and CAOs, the location where the main production activity is performed, and so forth.
CAO as a part of auxiliary establishments
The AES is performed every five years, to capture the activity of all auxiliaries of firms. Auxiliaries are establishments that do not perform production or transaction Finally, as columns 7 and 8 of Table 3 show, the growth of a given industry is not necessarily accompanied by a commensurate increase in the number of CAOs supporting the activity, suggesting heterogeneity across industries from an organizational perspective in both the spatial configuration and roles performed by CAOs in relation to the rest of the firm.
The Role of CAOs in Outsourcing
As noted in the introduction, the urban economics literature discusses the notion of "functional specialization" with the idea that a primary role of CAOs is to outsource, or to purchase business and financial services for their production units. Here, we examine the extent of outsourcing. While in our data, the purchases of financial services are not "observed," (they are typically reflected in loan rates and contract terms, which are not available in our data), there is in the data information on some outsourced business services. The AES asks auxiliaries for their expenditures on services such as legal and accounting in 1992, and also advertising services in 1997. In Table 4 , we report propensities to outsource for auxiliary establishments and CAOs, excluding those who we suspect are not responding to the questions regarding outsourcing (for more details, see the footnote under In addition, the table shows that outsourcing propensities may be increasing over time. Comparing the numbers between 1992 and 1997 for legal and accounting, we see a rise in propensities, modestly for legal services and substantially for accounting. The technology in intermediary service suppliers, and expertise and confidence in the use of outsourcing could be improving, although greater use in 1997 could also reflect recovery from the recession that occurred earlier in the decade.
In Table 5 , for CAOs that report outsourcing in 1997, we report expenditures on outsourcing as a fraction of their wage bill. Expenditure rates differ considerably across the services, reflecting both the importance of the intermediate input in production and the extent of in-house versus outsourced activity. Overall, expenditures on accounting outsourced are equal to 13.4% of CAO wage bills and for legal it is 15.2 %, while advertising is a huge 36.6%. Advertising is the big-ticket item that must draw CAOs to cities offering high quality, diverse advertising firms. Not surprisingly advertising is more important for CAOs supporting retailing, compared to that supporting manufacturing. Outsourcing of advertising for retail CAOs is 59.5% of CAO wage bills, while it is 24.4% for manufacturing. 5 Given the extent of services outsourced and the need for face-to-face interaction in service delivery, co-location with service providers may be important for CAO establishments (see Davis and Henderson, 2003; and Ono, 2003) .
In Table 6 , we look at the issue of substitution and complementarity between outsourcing and in-housing. Outsourcing a particular function is often viewed as replacing in-house production of that function in the firm. However, Table 6 -a indicates that CAOs that outsource a particular function have a 2 to 3 fold higher percentage of employees internally working at that function. A CAO's practice of outsourcing a particular function seems to imply that the CAO itself, as part of monitoring, coordinating, and partnering with suppliers, generally has a bigger not smaller in-house unit. In that sense of requiring in-house functions to support any degree of outsourcing, the two complement each other.
We further look at the relationship between the extent of outsourcing and in-house activity, for just CAOs that outsource a particular function. Table 6 -b presents the correlation coefficient between the share of employees engaged in a particular function in a CAO and the expense of outsourcing the function represented as a share of CAO wage bills. Interestingly, we see that the correlation is very small, which indicates that beyond a fixed cost of in-house support to have any outsourcing, as outsourcing grows, there is a tension between substitution and complementarity of outsourcing and in-house activity.
CAOs and Firm Structure
Above, we have provided an overview of auxiliaries and CAOs, showing that CAOs are predominantly associated with larger manufacturing and retail firms. We examined basic statistics on outsourcing, an important function of CAOs. In this section, we take a closer look first at the firm characteristics that are associated with having a CAO, and then at the extent to which CAOs are physically separated from their production plants.
Why might firms physically separate out administration functions? First, as firm activity at one location grows, administrative functions may reach a scale where they can which outsource any function. In general, auxiliary establishments are heterogeneous, outsourcing either all 12 no longer be housed in the plant. Moreover, separation removes administrators from the noise and pollution associated with production. Apart from this basic consideration, as discussed in the introduction, some papers in the literature on corporate governance and corporate culture hint that there are managerial advantages in just separating the monitoring or evaluation authority from plants. For example, as we mentioned in the introduction, Cremer (1995) suggests that, under some conditions, a firm may choose optimally a lower level of monitoring ability, since a more accurate technology reduces the agent's incentive to work to signal high ability (see also Aghion and Tirole, 1997) . In the context of spatial organization, a firm may separate administration from production activities to indicate the choice of lower monitoring technology. It is also possible that not locating firm monitoring authorities with any plants helps remove suspicion among plants about unfair treatment of some plants over others.
These reasons do not suggest that administration need be far removed from production. What are reasons for non-collocation? According to Duranton and Puga (2002) and Davis and Henderson (2003) , firms might have incentives to separate their administration from production in order to locate the administrative offices closer to diverse intermediate service suppliers, which are highly concentrated in central cities.
The proximity to suppliers facilitates face-to-face communication with suppliers, which is very important in purchasing services.
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Note that, as we will show later, of firms that have CAOs, 75% of them have CAOs only in counties where their production facilities are. We define CAOs as being collocated if they are in the same county as production units of the firm. This 75% collocation rate suggests that being close to production facilities is important for firms, although it is very possible that, within the same county, CAOs are located downtown while production is in less-populated suburbs. In that sense, our definition of collocation in this paper is somewhat crude. However, it is still the case that locating the CAO in the 13 same county does not significantly expand the variety of local intermediate services to which the firms have access.
Finally, we note that firms might locate CAOs away from production units but not necessarily where there are good outsourcing possibilities. As discussed above, firms with geographically dispersed plants, or that are industrially diverse, or larger, may require the authority for monitoring or evaluation to be separated from production, to improve the incentive of agents (plants). Non-collocation may help to enhance the independence of such authorities. However, it is also possible that firms, in order to coordinate production activities, need to locate CAOs centrally to all plants; such location may not necessarily be a large city.
In Table 7 , we start by reporting results from a probit analysis examining characteristics associated with firms that have CAOs, compared to those that don't. This exercise is carried out for all firms in the USA with at least one production plant plus one or more other establishments of any kind (plants, sales offices, auxiliaries, retail outlets, etc.). Many of our intuitions are supported by the correlations in Table 7 for continuous variables. Table 7 shows the impact on the probability of a one standard deviation change in the variables; while, for dummy variables, it gives the impact of a switch from zero to one. For these exercises, we set the base probability at .0683, the predicted propensity of a firm with average characteristics (instead of .107, which is the observed propensity to have a CAO among all 167,126 multi-establishment firms).
From the table, we can see that bigger firms are more likely to have CAOs. A one-standard deviation increase in firm employment and in the number of plants raises the base probability by .0587 and .0182 respectively. For the former, this is an 86% increase in the probability, a substantial impact. So, CAOs, as should be clear by now belong to bigger firms, but within bigger firms there is a lot of variation.
First, as mentioned above and in the introduction, if plants of a particular firm are industrially diversified, then it may increase the need to separate an evaluation authority from any plant so as either to better coordinate across diverse activities or to avoid some plants suspecting unfair treatment. For firms with two or more plants we calculate a
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index of the degree of plant specialization across industries. This is the sum of squared shares of firm plant employment in the ten different industries. A 14 higher HHI, thus greater industrial specialization, decreases the likelihood for a firm to have CAOs. A one-standard deviation increase in the HHI, or degree of specialization, reduces the probability of having a CAO by .0256, a reduction from the base probability of 37%. Given that we control for the degree of geographical dispersion of production activity, the statistically significant coefficient of HHI seems to indicate that even nonspatial aspects that characterize firms are important in firms' decisions concerning their spatial organization.
Turning to spatial dispersion, having plants in two or more counties, as opposed to just one county, raises the probability of having a CAO by .0351, a 51.4% increase.
Maximal distance between any two counties with plants raises the probability of having a between the total employment of a county in which a firm has its dominant production activity (in terms of the firm's plant employment at the county level), and the propensity for a firm to have a CAO. Based on Duranton and Puga (2002) , it is possible that, in bigger counties, more business services are locally available, and therefore there is less need for a firm to establish a separate CAO if its production facilities are already located in a large metro area. The county size at the dominant plant location may also represent the scope of information available as well as the degree of visibility. As shown in the There may be a concern that the industry dummies included in our probit analysis only broadly control for industry specific factors that influence a firm's propensity to separate administration. Especially within the manufacturing sector, due to the varying degree of noise or unpleasant smells from production processes, which would influence the propensity for a firm to separate administration, it would make sense to control for finer industrial categories. Thus, we perform the probit analysis including 2-digit level SIC dummies when the dominant production is manufacturing. The results remained qualitatively the same for all of the key variables.
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Note also that, in our sample, firms with only one plant are included only when they have at least one auxiliary establishment or CAO, since otherwise, they are not multi-establishment firms. This would increase the propensity to have a CAO for firms with one plant in our sample and may bias the coefficient of the number of plants downward. Thus, as another robustness check, we perform the same probit analysis by limiting the sample to firms with two or more plants, for which firms are included even if they do not have any auxiliaries. Column (3) in Table 7 shows the result of the probit with the new sample, which turned out to be qualitatively the same as that of probit with all of the multi-establishment firms.
We have also performed Tobit analysis using the number of CAOs as a dependent variable. We found that factors that are positively (negatively) associated with a firm's Table 8 presents a probit analysis that examines characteristics associated with firms that have non-collocated CAOs, given the set of firms with CAOs. Here, for firms with any number of CAOs, we ask whether the firm has a non-collocated CAO. We use the same firm characteristics included in Table 7 , but add a control for the total number of CAOs since the probability of having any particular type of CAO will increase when firms have more CAOs. We also performed the same probit analysis limiting the sample to firms with only one CAO, asking whether that CAO was co-located or not; these results are qualitatively the same as the ones in Table 8 .
As shown in the table, the probability that a firm has at least one non-collocated CAO increases in situations where the firm is industrially diversified and geographically dispersed. Such features may not only make it more necessary to physically separate monitoring and/or evaluation authorities from production activities, but may also require such authorities to be located more independently (thus non-collocated with all production facilities) as the firm structure becomes more complex. Again, it is worth noting that the evidence seems to suggest that the degree of industrial specialization -a non-spatial aspect -influences a firms' spatial organization. As for the geographical dispersion of production activities, one could also interpret the coefficients as indicating that firms search for locations central to all plants.
We find the probability of having a non-collocated CAO increases when the firm has more of them. This could be just statistical, from having more draws on the possibility of non-collocation. However, this may also be due to the heterogeneity in functions that CAOs perform within a firm, as firm size grows. Some CAOs may be collocated to assist a particular plant, while others may be non-collocated in order to gain the access to diverse service available only in large cities.
We find perhaps oddly that the coefficient of the number of plants is not significant while average plant size is negative and significant. Controlling for the number of plants, as the average plant size increases, CAOs seem to be located closer to plants. Big production activities may have some specific needs that require administration to be collocated.
Lastly, we find that the firms whose production is located in larger cities tend to have more collocated CAOs. The coefficient is statistically significant. This is consistent with an outsourcing story where firms that have production facilities in smaller cities and rural areas would construct CAOs where the access to diverse service inputs is easier (Duranton and Puga, 2002) . Large cities would also facilitate the access to information (Lovely et al., 2002) and improve the visibility of firms. Firms with production facilities in large cities have less need for a non-collocated CAO.
CAOs and Their Location
Here we turn to location patterns of CAOs and auxiliaries. Given common perceptions about cities such as New York, one might expect to see CAOs are highly spatially concentrated. However in the previous section, we saw that CAOs also tend to be tied to where their production facilities are. These plants are spatially dispersed and, as we will see, CAOs are somewhat spatially dispersed. Figure 1 gives the basic picture, in which, for each USA county, we plot the location quotient against the log of county employment for 1997. The location quotient is the ratio of the county's share of national employment in CAOs to its share of national private employment, and indicates whether a county has a high or low concentration of an activity relative to its share of all economic activity. Many of the small counties were suppressed in Figure 1 in order to meet the requirement for data disclosure; the figure, however, reveals that there is vast diversity in the concentration of CAOs even within counties of similar size, based on the distribution of counties that fall above or below a location quotient of one. We expected large counties to have high relative shares of
CAOs. Yet we see that many mid-size counties also have high CAO location quotients.
In sum, the patterns indicate possible heterogeneity whereby some CAOs are located in larger urban counties with concentrations of business services, and others colocated near their production plants in smaller counties. As we discussed, there are various organizational and urban economic reasons to collocate or non-collocate CAOs with plants as well as to locate CAOs in large cities or not. The rather unexpected degree of geographical dispersion of CAOs seems to be due to the combination of such factors.
Is the CAO concentration consistent with the traditional view?
Here, we check whether our data support the traditional view that CAOs have very high concentrations in the very largest cities, by focusing on presenting the statistics on New York and Chicago. The traditional view would espouse that, for a city like New York, CAOs are the source of New York's economic life. Table 6 provides a summary of CAO shares of these cities in 1997. The numbers in Table 6 City is critical and choose to locate a CAO there as a result. 9 In sum, the table seems to reject a view that headquarters provide the economic base for some big cities (Ginzberg, 1977; Aksoy and Marshall, 1992) .
Opening and Closing of CAOs
So far, we have examined how a firm's spatial configurations, in the sense of the separation between administration and production activities, vary across firms depending on different firm characteristics. We found that many firm characteristics -both spatial and non-spatial -are important determinants of firms' decision where to locate their administration. Then, does a firm adjust the location of CAOs as its characteristics 9 Note that we expected a large concentration of CAOs in Delaware as it is well known that many firms incorporate there. We did not find an exceptional concentration there, and confirmed with the Delaware Department of State that firms are not required by law to have a physical presence in the state in order to incorporate there. Firms can incorporate through a retained law firm, and we do observe a large relative concentration of law firms in Wilmington.
20 change over time, and/or as it learns, through the experience, the optimal places for administration or even the spatial organizational style suitable to its own organization?
In this section, we study the events underlying any changes in firms' spatial configurations, by focusing on the patterns of opening and closing of CAOs over time.
Since we have data by Census year, we identify the opening and closing of CAOs every five years by using the establishment identifier.
There are two establishment identifiers available in our data sets. One is called the Census File Number (CFN), which contains both a firm identifier and a within firm establishment number. Since it contains the firm identifier, the CFN of a particular establishment changes when the ownership of the establishment changes with mergers and acquisitions. The other is the Permanent Plant Number (PPN), which is an identifier associated with a physical location of the establishment such as a building or office suite.
In previous studies, PPNs have been used to study entry and exit patterns in manufacturing (Dunne et. al., 1988) . Manufacturing plants are generally tied to a specific location, given their fixed capital (that is often specific to the production of a particular good). Thus, when there is new PPN, it usually is a new production facility. At the same time, when a PPN disappears, it means the plant was shut down. CAO activities, on the other hand, are not tied to a particular office space, being generally less capital intensive.
For example, a CAO when it moves its location from one office to another nearby may be given a different PPN, when there is no change in its basic function, size, and role. Table 10 shows the overall opening and closing rates for any five-year period from 1977 to 1997. The opening rate between years t and t+1 is the ratio of the number of CAOs that appeared between years t and t+1 to that of existing (total) CAOs in year t.
The closing rate between year t and t+1 is the ratio of the number of CAOs that disappeared between t and t+1 to that of the existing CAOs in year t.
Both the opening and closing rates are fairly high in any five-year period; the opening rate is between 54% and 61%, while the closing rate is somewhat lower, between 48% and 52%. These rates are much greater than the five-year entry rates of 40-42% and exit rates of 34-39%, calculated for manufacturing plants over the time period [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] found by Dunne et al. (1988) . 13 Given that CAOs have in general low fixed capital it may not be surprising to find the turnover of CAOs to be higher than that of manufacturing plants. However considering that these are the decisions of mature firms, a research task 14 Again one can make the argument that the CAOs with their low fixed capital requirements are more malleable, which makes the closing of large supporting offices relatively easier than for manufacturing plants.
While we observe high turnover of CAOs, it is useful to consider how much of the CAO turnover is the result of firm entry and exit. In Table 11 , we distinguish between the opening of CAOs by existing firms from those of new firms. We see that around 80%
of new CAOs are set up by existing firms (Table 11 (1) a). We further attempt to break out how much of the opening of CAOs is due to ownership changes for pre-existing CAOs. As one can see, most new CAOs are those which are newly created (Table 11 ( 1) a-1). The observed high turnover rates of CAOs are not due to the ownership changes. Now, let us look at the size of new CAOs, distinguishing between those which are opened by existing firms and those which are opened by new firms. In Table 11 (2), we 23 calculate the relative size of new CAOs as compared to the pre-existing CAOs. We can see that the size of new CAOs of existing firms is bigger than those created when new firms start. It is possible that existing firms are generally larger than new firms and thus require larger CAOs. However, it is also possible that existing firms are more confident in the success of a new CAO based on their experience and thus construct larger CAOs than new firms.
Again for the latest two periods, for which PPNs are available, we look at finer categories by dividing the new CAOs into those which are newly constructed and those which were previously affiliated with other firms. From the table, CAOs that are acquired from other firms are larger than CAOs that are newly constructed. For example, the category in Table 11 (2) a-2 is typically the result of a firm acquiring other firms, and the CAOs taken over are between 3.9% to 24% greater than pre-existing CAOs affiliated with the same firms. The same tendency is found for the category in Table 11 (2) b-2, in which the acquisition of CAOs is mostly due to two or more firms merging and creating another new firm. Given the difference in size of an acquired CAO in relation to a new CAO, acquiring firms may be able to benefit from the revealed attributes of the existing workers and location as demonstrating that it is a favorable place to operate a CAO.
Next, in Table 12 we attempt to distinguish between CAO closures by continuing firms and by firms that exit. 60 to 70% of CAO closures are by firms that continue their operations (Table 12 (1) a). For firm closures that are mergers, CAOs sometimes remain and continue to operate under the new affiliation (Table 12 (1) b-2). When this happens, the CAOs are much greater in size than those which close, and even greater than existing CAOs which remain in operation under the same affiliation (Table 12 (2) b-2). This could indicate that acquiring firms select successful CAOs to remain in operation.
In Table 13 , we look at the pattern of closing of young CAOs by presenting the closure rate of CAOs that were opened in the previous period. The table shows that the rates of early closure presented here are somewhat higher as compared to the overall closure rate we saw in Table 10 . The share of early closures by firms that continue to be in business is also somewhat greater than that calculated based on all CAOs closed in Table 12 . However, as we can see by comparing Table 13 (2) and Table 12 (2), the size of closed CAOs relative to those which were kept in operation is bigger for the case of 24 young CAOs. Young CAOs may be closed even if they are big. This may be an indication of some degree of experimentation a la Jovanovic (1982) , but with experimentation in finding the optimal location for a CAO in relation to the needs of the firm. For example, firms may experiment with locations to find an optimal balance between tasks of monitoring and coordinating on the one hand and outsourcing on the other.
In were closed before 1997. In the end, only 10% of the cohort of CAOs that entered between 1977 and 1982 remained in 1997. One finding is that the CAOs that remain the longest were also largest in size when they were created. While firms may experiment in finding the optimal locations for their CAOs, it is possible that the size of CAOs at their entry reflect a firm's prior conjecture on the success of CAOs.
Conclusion
In this paper, we attempt to contribute to filling a void between theoretical models of internal firms' spatial organization and the limited empirical study of this organization.
As there are many firms that operate in multiple locations, by locating different functions in different areas, empirical work in this area is important to understand what causes the concentration of some functions (Duranton and Puga, 2002) and what is the decision making mechanism behind a firm's initial decision to separate some functions from its main physical location.
Our focus in this paper is to present facts surrounding firms' decisions to physically separate part of their administrative activities and construct stand alone central administrative offices -CAOs. As we showed, there are significant differences between firms with and without CAOs. We found that firms that own CAOs are much bigger than those without CAOs. CAOs are typically created to support manufacturing and retail and wholesale businesses of firms. Firms are more likely to have CAOs if they are more 25 industrially diversified and more geographically dispersed, and if their main production facilities are in smaller cities. However, interestingly, even when firms decide to separate administration from production facilities, most firms locate their CAOs nearby.
In addition to the cross-sectional differences between firms with and without CAOs, we also present facts surrounding the dynamics of the decision to open and close CAOs. We found that both opening and closing rates are high and the sizes of new and closed CAOs are large, possibly due to low fixed set-up costs. We also found some indications that in the process of opening and closing CAOs, firms go through some experimentation, to find the optimal locations for their CAOs and the optimal spatial configuration for the entire firm. Source: Authors' calculations based on the AES, SSELs, and the CBPs.
1) The index is the sum of squared shares of firm plants' employment in the 9 industries in Table 4 .
2) Distances are between centroids of counties. Weights are numbers of firm plants in each county. The measure is equivalent to the average of all pairwise distances between plants (where that distance is zero for plants in the same county).
3) The dominant county for a firm is the county with the plurality of firm plant employment. The variable is ln (total county private employment).
4) Excluded category is light manufacturing.
( ): Huber/White/sandwitch robust standard error ** is significant at 5% level. * is significant at 10% level. Source: Authors' calculation based on the AES, SSELs, and CBPs.
1) Excluded category is light manufacturing.
( ): Huber/White/sandwitch robust standard error ** is significant at 5% level. * is significant at 10% level. 2 Conditional exit rate, i.e., the probability of exiting in cell, given that the CAO has survived until that cell.
* In our sample we define a CAO as an auxiliary establishment whose greatest employment category is administrative employment. For most CAOs this holds true over the sample period, but in some occasions, CAOs change their employment composition sufficiently to switch their majority employment away from administrative employment (switch-out), and in some cases, auxiliaries switched in from one of the other functions (switch-in). 
